Outsourcing the board : how board service providers can improve corporate governance, Stephen M. Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson

Resource Information

The instance Outsourcing the board : how board service providers can improve corporate governance, Stephen M. Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson represents a material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in Biddle Law Library - University of Pennsylvania Law School.

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Label

Outsourcing the board : how board service providers can improve corporate governance, Stephen M. Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson

Title remainder

how board service providers can improve corporate governance

Statement of responsibility

Stephen M. Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson

Instantiates

• Outsourcing the board : how board service providers can improve corporate governance

Publication

• Cambridge | New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 2018

Copyright

• ©2018

Bibliography note

Includes bibliographical references and index

Carrier category

volume

Carrier category code

• nc

Carrier MARC source

rdacarrier

Content category

text

Content type code

• txt

Content type MARC source

rdacontent

Contents

Machine generated contents note: Introduction: I. Corporate Boards: 1. A Brief History of the Board; 1.1. The Political Origins of Corporate Boards; 1.2. The Privatization of the Corporation and the Changing Role of the Board; 1.3. The Board's Evolving Modern Role; 1.4. Summary; 2: What do Boards do? ; 2.1. The Roles Played by the Modern Corporate Board; 2.2. Management; 2.3. Service; 2.4. Monitoring; 2.5. Diversity; 2.6. Overlapping Roles and the Crudeness of Categories; 2.7. Role Conflicts; 2.8. Evolution Over Time; 3. Grading Boards; 3.1. Public Perceptions; 3.2. Even Graded on a Curve, Boards Fail; 3.3. Boards Fail Even at Grading Themselves; 3.4. Showing Improvement; 3.5. But There's Still Room for Improvement; 4. Why Boards Fail; 4.1. Introduction; 4.2. Time Constraints; 4.3. Information Asymmetries; 4.4. Too Many Generalists; 4.5. Bad Incentives; 4.6. Boards Refuse to Lead; 4.7. Boards Lack Cohesiveness; 4.8. SOX Locked Boards into a One Size Fits All Model; II. The Board Service Provider: 5. Board Service Providers: The Basic Idea; 5.1. Introduction; 5.2. The Board Service Provider; 5.3. Appointment and Elections; 5.4. Composition and Function; 5.5. Compensation; 5.6. Liability; 5.7. Summary; 6. How BSPs Address the Pathologies of Modern Corporate Governance; 6.1. Managerial Hegemony Theory; 6.2. Class Hegemony Theory; 6.3. Resource Dependence Theory; 6.4. Stakeholder Theory; 6.5. Stewardship Theory; 6.6. Agency Theory; 6.7. Summary; 7. Incentivizing the BSP; 7.1. Compensation incentives; 7.2. Liability-based incentives; 7.3. Reputational incentives; 7.4. Exposure to market forces; 7.5. Measurability; III. Legal Issues: 8. BSPs and the Law; 8.1. Legal Obstacles to BSPs Under U.S. Federal and State Law; 8.2. The Law in Other Countries; 8.3. The Case for Changing the Law; 9. BSPs and the Emerging Federal Law of Corporations; 9.1. Director Independence; 9.2. BSPs and the CEO/Chair Duality Issue; 9.3. The Audit Committee; 9.4. Section 404 Internal Controls; 9.5. The Compensation Committee; 9.6. The Nominating Committee; IV. BSPs & the Frontiers of Corporate Governance: 10. BSPs and Proxy Access; 10.1. A Brief Overview of Proxy Access; 10.2. Proxy Access and BSPs; 11. The BSP as an alternative to quinquennial board elections; 11.1. Introduction; 11.2. The Quinquennial Election Proposal; 11.3. The Quinquennial Election and the BSP; 11.4. Quinquennial Elections and Mandatory Rotation of the BSP; 11.5. Summary; 12. The BSP in a Post-Monitoring Board World; 12.1. The Thickly Informed Board; 12.2. The BSP as Thickly Informed Board; 12.3. The Private Equity Analog; 12.4. Summary; V. Concluding Thoughts: 13. Anticipating Objections; 13.1. Overcoming the Status Quo Bias; 13.2. Reduced Accountability; 13.3. Loss of Personal Service; 13.4. Loss of Advantages of Group Decision Making; 13.5. BSPs will be Captured by Management; 13.6. BSP Incentives Inadequately Aligned to Shareholder Interests; 13.7. Isn't This Just One More Costly Intermediary? ; 13.8. Conflicts of Interest; 14. Conclusion

Dimensions

23 cm

Extent

xiii, 234 pages

Isbn

9781107193697

Lccn

2017058381

Media category

unmediated

Media MARC source

rdamedia

Media type code

• n

Note

GOBI Library Solutions from EBSCO

Record ID

.b7889835

System control number

(OCoLC)1018456678