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The Resource Reputation and judicial tactics : a theory of national and international courts, Shai Dothan, Tel Aviv University, Faulty of Law

Reputation and judicial tactics : a theory of national and international courts, Shai Dothan, Tel Aviv University, Faulty of Law

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The item Reputation and judicial tactics : a theory of national and international courts, Shai Dothan, Tel Aviv University, Faulty of Law represents a specific, individual, material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in Biddle Law Library - University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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Summary: This book argues that national and international courts seek to enhance their reputations through the strategic exercise of judicial power. Courts often cannot enforce their judgments and must rely on reputational sanctions to ensure compliance. One way to do this is for courts to improve their reputation for generating compliance with their judgments. When the court's reputation is increased, parties will be expected to comply with its judgments and the reputational sanction on a party that fails to comply will be higher. This strategy allows national and international courts, which cannot enforce their judgments against states and executives, to improve the likelihood that their judgments will be complied with over time. This book describes the judicial tactics that courts use to shape their judgments in ways that maximize their reputational gains

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Label: Reputation and judicial tactics : a theory of national and international courts

Statement of responsibility: Shai Dothan, Tel Aviv University, Faulty of Law

Summary: This book argues that national and international courts seek to enhance their reputations through the strategic exercise of judicial power. Courts often cannot enforce their judgments and must rely on reputational sanctions to ensure compliance. One way to do this is for courts to improve their reputation for generating compliance with their judgments. When the court's reputation is increased, parties will be expected to comply with its judgments and the reputational sanction on a party that fails to comply will be higher. This strategy allows national and international courts, which cannot enforce their judgments against states and executives, to improve the likelihood that their judgments will be complied with over time. This book describes the judicial tactics that courts use to shape their judgments in ways that maximize their reputational gains